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Abstract
This paper investigates the relation between rmsR&D incentives and their compati-
bility decisions regarding durable, imperfectly substitutable network goods in the presence
of forward looking consumers. Non drastic product innovation is sequential and both an
initially dominant rm and a smaller rival are potential inventors. For su¢ ciently innovative
future products, our rst key result is that the dominant rm invests more when there is
compatibility and voluntarily decides to supply interoperability information. This happens
as the probability that he is the only inventor increases, allowing him to enjoy a higher
expected future prot that outweighs the current lost revenue. For economies whose initial
market size is considerably large, the rival also demands compatibility but this is no longer
true in industries with a relatively smaller number of existing consumers. For less innova-
tive new versions, the dominant rm rejects compatibility and there is a cuto¤ in network
externalities below which he invests more when there is incompatibility. Regarding welfare,
we nd that a laissez faire Competition Law with respect to the IPR holders is socially
preferable.
1Department of Economics; University of Warwick.
2I would like to express my gratitude to Claudio Mezzetti, Daniel Sgroi, Dan Bernhardt and Udara Peiris.
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1 Introduction
Do dominant rms always refuse to supply interoperability information of their durable,
network products and do smaller rivals always demand to be compatible with the current
market leader? Even if dominant rms decide not to allow compatibility, does this neces-
sarily imply that their R&D incentives are curbed? Which is the economy that o¤ers the
socially preferable balance of aggregate R&D incentives: one that operates under mandatory
compatibility or under a laissez faire Competition Law? These questions are certainly not
new but this is the rst paper they are examined in an environment where technological
progress is modelled in a scenario with sequential innovations of durable, network products.
Although standard economic theory predicts that dominant rms may refuse to reveal
interoperability information to smaller rivals3, there are many cases in technology markets
where rms with leading market shares welcome compatibility even from direct competitors.4
Absent network e¤ects, a potential explanation is sequential, important innovation: the
initial inventor allows imitation instead of getting a patent as the (exogenous) probability of
future inventions increases allowing him to enjoy a higher expected payo¤ which outweighs
the loss from a lower current prot.5
In this paper, we provide an alternative explanation: we endogenize rmsprobability
of successful innovation by studying the competitorsR&D incentives as well as their com-
patibility choices in the presence of durable, network goods and we show that sequential
important innovation may lead the dominant rm to voluntarily support compatibility even
if it may compete directly with its rival in the future. In this case, dominant rms invest
less if the Intellectual Property Rights system is very strong. In particular, we consider a
model where substitutable, sequential innovations result from a discrete time R&D stochastic
process and technological progress is modelled with exogenous quality improvements.6 We
3See Chen, Doraszelski and Harrington (2009).
4See Bessen and Maskin (2009) for examples concerning dominant rmswelcoming competition.
5See Bessen and Maskin (2009).
6Further work will endogenize the quality improvements.
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give both an initially dominant and a rival rm the ability to come up with valuable ideas
following a commonly observed scenario of creative destruction in the Hi-tech and software
industry where smaller innovative rivals often displace initial market leaders.7 We nd that
for important innovative products, the leader invests more when compatibility is present
and in fact, he voluntarily chooses to o¤er interoperability information to the rival who in
turn accepts it only when the current market size is relatively large. For less innovative
products, we nd that when network e¤ects are larger than a cuto¤, a laissez faire Compe-
tition Law with respect to Intellectual Property holders leads the dominant rm to reject
compatibility and also invest less than in the economy that compatibility is mandatory. Our
welfare analysis, based on a more "economically sound" comparison of the market outcome
with the socially optimal level of investment, shows that a laissez faire Competition Law is
socially preferable compared to an economy operating under mandatory compatibility, espe-
cially when network e¤ects are relatively weak. These results cast some doubts on whether
mandated compatibility by Competition Authorities may lead to socially undesirable results.
This paper is organized as follows: the next subsection discusses the Related Literature.
Section 2 presents the Model. In Section 3, we solve for equilibrium outcomes when com-
patibility is either mandatory and under a laissez faire Competition Law. Section 4 provides
the socially e¢ cient investment level that a social planner would induce and a comparison
with the market equilibrium investment under the economies that operate under mandatory
compatibility or under a laissez faire Competition Law and Section 5 concludes.
1.1 Related Literature
This paper relates to the literature regarding rmsattitude towards compatibility. In an
economy where network e¤ects exist and product quality is constant, Chen, Doraszelski and
Harrington (2009), Malueg and Schwartz (2006), Economides and Flyer (1998), Cremer, Rey
and Tirole (2000) investigate whether compatibility is supported by dominant rms where
7For example, Microsoft Excel replaced Lotus 1-2-3 and Microsoft Word replaced WordPerfect.
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modelling usually consists of a two-stage structure: rst rms make compatibility decisions
and then they engage into price or quantity competition. Although compatibility increases
the number of potential buyers because of a larger network, the market leader prefers not to
support it because otherwise, he would lose the advantage of the larger installed base. When
sequential innovation occurs with certainty and products are substitutable, Athanasopou-
los (2014) showed that a dominant market player o¤ers interoperability information of his
durable products to a smaller innovative rival when he expects a moderately large, future
quality improvement from his competitor. Thus, strategic pricing allows the market leader
to extract more of the higher expected total surplus when he supports compatibility. An
imprortant assumption in this model is that the rival is the only rm that can innovate in
the future. Our work di¤ers because unlike that paper, both competitors are potential future
innovators. Moreover, innovation is no longer certain and we assume that the investment
cost is a function of the probability of success. For su¢ ciently innovative future products,
we also nd that the dominant rm voluntarily supports compatibility.
When network e¤ects are not present and innovations are sequential and complementary,
Bessen and Maskin (2009) showed that the initial innovator may welcome imitation because
it allows both competitors to invest, increasing the exogenous probability of successful in-
novation and his second period prot, outweighing the loss from the foregone rst period
revenues. We depart from their work in a number of ways: First, we assume that direct
network e¤ects exist and products are durable. Second, there is an alternative process that
allows for product innovation even if there is incompatibility in the market. Third, unlike
their paper where the probability of successful innovation is a parameter, we adopt a game
theoretical approach where rmsR&D cost is a function of the probability of success. We
also consider forward looking customers and their role in determining equilibrium outcomes
and the social optimum. We agree with the message of their paper: dominant rms wel-
come compatibility when future products are su¢ ciently innovative while interestingly, we
nd that the smaller rival may reject compatibility if the initial market size is relatively
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small. We also show that the initial market leader rejects interoperability for less important
expected new products.
This work also relates to a threatened incumbents and a smaller rivals R&D incentives
when the economy operates under mandatory compatibility or a laissez faire Competition
Law with respect to Intellectual Property Rights holders when network e¤ects exist and
substitutable products are durable. The Literature has focused mostly on the initial market
structure and assesses whether a monopolist with perfectly exclusive Property Rights has
higher or lower R&D incentives than his counterpart under perfect or imperfect competition.8
In this work, we assume an initial monopolist who is threatened to be displaced by a smaller
innovative rival. We nd that when network e¤ects are relatively weak and for less innovative
products, the dominant rm invests more when he does not supply interoperability, not
allowing the rival to use his network. When the new versions are relatively important, the
market leader initially invests more when compatibility is supported.9
Regarding welfare, Bessen and Maskin (2009) showed that for important complementary
innovations, imitation raises welfare and patents may impede innovation. When network
e¤ects are present, Economides (2006) also found that compatibility raises social and con-
sumerswelfare. We nd that a laissez faire Competition Law either leads to compatibility
or o¤ers a socially preferable balance of both competitorsR&D incentives compared to the
economy that operates under mandatory compatibility.
2 The Model
Consider the market for computer software applications where the current market leader
must choose how much to invest into improving its durable, network product. The rm also
needs to decide whether to support compatibility of its current and future version with a
8See Gilbert (2006) for an excellent survey on issues related to the initial market structure and the rms
incentives.
9Current work looks at the initial market structure and the competitorsincentives when network e¤ects
are present and products are durable.
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smaller rival that can also potentially innovate and has the same set of possible strategies
regarding compatibility of her future product and investment decisions.
On the supply side, the sequence of events is as follows: at date t=0, competitors si-
multaneously decide their investment levels as well as their attitude towards compatibility.
Compatibility is a binary decision, is achieved bilaterally and comes free of charge.10 The
two research lines are independent and no rm has a cost advantage in its R&D process over
its opponent. More precisely, we assume that R&D spending is quadratic in the probability
of successfully improving product quality.
At date t = 1, the dominant rm chooses the price for its initial version of quality q111
while in the second (t = 2), the two rms compete a la Bertrand. If both research lines
are successful, rms sell an improved product of expected quality qe2 (q
e
2 > q1), which is
considered as exogenous in the model.12 Forward incompatibility of the product of quality
q1 prevents its users from working with a le that is created with a product of higher quality
q2. If compatibility is supported and because of backward compatibility, buyers of a product
of quality q2 join a network of maximum size.13 In contrast, when there is incompatibility,
purchasers of a product of quality q2 join only their sellers network. Note that both rms
goal is to maximise their expected prots where the marginal cost of production for all
product versions is normalized to zero.14
On the demand side, consumers are identical and arrive in constant ows t (t = 1; 2).
At date t=1, 1 observe the price for the product of quality q1 and must decide whether to
buy it. Their utility is partially dependent on network e¤ects, captured by the parameter :
Thus, if they buy the product of quality q1; their utility (gross of price) is q1 + 1x1   c;
where x1 is the 1 customersfraction that also buys q1 and c is these customersadoption
10See Malueg and Schwartz (2006).
11We follow Ellison and Fudenberg (2000) who also considered quality as a positive, real number q.
12Current work endogenizes the quality improvement.
13See Ellison and Fudenberg (2000) for a paper where backward compatibility and forward incompatibility
are present.
14Zero marginal cost is consistent with the applications in the computer software market industry.
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cost.15 Of course, these customersoverall benet depends on their forecasts regarding the
second period play.
At date t=2 and if there is a new product in the market, the new (2) and the old
(1) customers make their purchasing decisions after they observe the rival rmsprices.
Old customerspurchasing decision given announced prices resembles a coordination game
and can have multiple equilibria. Following the literature, old consumers may be able to
coordinate either to the Pareto optimal outcome or to what all the members of their class
prefer.16 In the similar coordination problem related to the new customers purchasing
decisions, the standard assumption is that buyers with the same preferences act as if they
were a single player. Thus, after observing the prices, they coordinate to what is best for
all of them. Since price discrimination is possible, both competitors can o¤er lower prices to
old customers. We restrict attention to pure rmsstrategies and all consumers make their
purchasing decisions simultaneously while we assume that they decide to purchase a superior
product rather than an old version and join a network of superior than a smaller size even
when their net utility may be equivalent. We also assume the same discount factor  for all
the agents in the economy.
Figure 1 summarizes the timing of the agentsmoves:
3 Market outcome
In this section, we will solve for equilibrium outcomes; that is, rmsinvestment decisions,
their prices in both the rst and the second period as well as customerschoices. We will
start our analysis by considering the case where compatibility is mandatory.
15Note that the utility function may not be necessarily linear in income (any monotonic transformation
would su¢ ce) but linear utility simplies the analysis.
16See Ellison and Fudenberg (2000).
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Figure 1: Timing of the agentsmoves where D stands for the dominant rm and R for the
rival.
3.1 Mandatory compatibility
We will solve the model using backwards induction, starting from the second period rms
pricing decisions (t = 2), going back to calculating the dominant rms price for his initial
version of quality q1 (t = 1) as well as the competitorsoptimal investment and compatibility
decisions (t = 0).
3.1.1 Second period (t = 2)
Imagine that both rms innovate and think rst of the new customers (2) who join a network
of maximum size independently of where they purchase their new product of quality q2. Thus,
given the competitorsprices and if we restrict attention to linear utility in income17, their
utility by purchasing any of the two new products is q2 +   c  p22i; after normalizing the
second period market size to unity where the three subscripts in the price charged denote
17The same results hold for any utility function, V (:):
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the quality of the product (q2), the type of consumers (2) and the product maker (i = 1 for
the leader and i = 2 for the smaller rival), respectively. If all these customers purchase the
dominant rms initial version, their utility given his price p12 is q1 + 1x1 + 2  c  p12,
where x1 is the 1 customersfraction that sticks to q1.
Old customers (1) observe the prices set by the competitors and their utility is q2 + 
cu p21i; if they buy q2 from competitor i and q1+1x1+2x2 if they stick to the product
of quality q118, where x1; x2 are the customersfractions that either stick or buy q1 in the
second period. If old customers make their purchasing decisions independently of what other
old customers do, they will buy either the dominant or the smaller rms product when:
p21i  q + 2(1  x2)  cu; 8i = 1; 2:19
We make the following assumption:
Assumption 1 (A1): q + 2x2   cu  0; 0  x2  1:
This assumption says that the old second period customersexpected benet from buying
any new product is at least greater than the cost of learning how to use it and allows us
to isolate the role of network externalities and the expected quality improvements in rms
strategies and welfare.
Thus, in such a case, all customers buy or purchase any new version for free due to
Bertrand competition.
If only the dominant rm innovates, he remains the sole supplier in both periods. Thus,
given his prices, new customersutility if they purchase the new product (q2) is q2+ c p221;
while if they all buy his initial version (q1), their utility is q1 +1x1 +2  c  p121; where
x1 is the old customersfraction that sticks to the initial version. Old customersutility if
they upgrade to the dominant rms q2 is q2 + a  cu  p211 while their utility if they stick to
18These customers are induced to buy the initial product of quality q1 at t = 1 (see the Appendix for the
rst period analysis).
19See the Appendix for the prices these customers are willing to pay if they coordinate to what all the
other members of their class prefer.
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the old version is q1 + 1x1 + 2x2: If these customers coordinate on the Pareto optimal
outcome, they will buy the new product even if everyone else sticks to q1 (x1 = 1) if:
p211  q + 2(1  x2)  cu:
Thus, since the dominant rms second period prot is a decreasing function of the number
of new customers who stick to the initial version, the market leaders optimal choice is to
stop selling his initial version and the prices he charges to customers are p221 = q2 +    c;
p211 = q + 2   cu:
When the rival rm is the sole inventor, the dominant rm can no longer stop selling
his initial version in the second period as such a choice would imply a potentially collusive
behaviour. Thus, in this scenario, the competitorsoptimal prices are p222 = q + 1;
p121 = 0; p212 = q + 2   cu and all customers buy the rival rms innovative product.
The last case occurs when none of the competitors innovates where the new customers
face a price p121 = q1 + a  c from the dominant rm which extracts all their surplus.20
3.1.2 First and initial period (t = 1 and t = 0)
In the rst period (t = 1), the dominant rm decides on the optimal price of his initial
version of quality q1 wishing to extract consumers total expected surplus and potential
buyers (1) make their purchasing decisions, depending on their expectations regarding the
market participantssecond period behaviour.
Moving to the initial period (t = 0), both rms decide their optimal investment taking
into consideration that the rival is also maximising his/her expected total prots.21 We will
consider the following possible scenarios:
Scenario 2 (A2): qe < 1; qe  1cu: This scenario occurs when the expected
quality improvement is smaller relative to the network e¤ects.
20See the Appendix for the table containing the second period prices in the di¤erent scenarios.
21See the Appendix for the rivals maximization problems and their optimal investment levels.
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Scenario 3 (A3): qe > 1; qe  1cu: In this case, the expected quality improve-
ment is larger than the extent of network externalities.
The next lemma summarizes the market equilibrium outcome when compatibility is
mandatory:
Lemma 1 Both competitors optimal choice is to invest into developping the product of
quality q2: If A2 holds, the dominant rms investment decision is an increasing function of
the rivals optimal choice. When A3 holds, the dominant rms investment is a decreasing
function of the rivals optimal choice. Customers in the rst period purchase the product of
quality q1 and in the second, the whole market purhases the superior product of quality q2.
When network e¤ects are larger than the expected quality improvement (A2), the domi-
nant rms reaction function is an increasing function of the rivals investment decision.22 On
the other hand, when network e¤ects are relatively weak (A3), the dominant rm seems to
free ride on the rivals investment choice as his expected second period benet by increasing
his probability of success would be outweighed by the additional rst period cost.
3.2 Laissez faire Competition Law
Under a laissez faire Competition Law, both rms initially choose their investment levels as
well as whether they will support compatibility in the future period.
3.2.1 Second period (t = 2)
Think rst of the scenario where only the rival innovates and consider the new second period
customers (2). After they observe the prices, if they all purchase the rivals product of
quality q2; their utility is q2+2+1(1 x1)  c p222, where 1 x1 is the old customers
fraction that purchases q2: If they all buy q1; their utility is q1 + 2 + 1x1   c   p121:
22See the Appendix for the graphical representation of the di¤erent cases.
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Thus, these customers prefer the rivals superior product of quality q2 if:
p222   p121  q + 1(1  2x1):
Old customers also observe the prices and decide whether to buy the superior product or
stick to the initial version.23 If they purchase q2; their utility is q2 + 1(1  x1) + 2(1 
x2)  cu   p212 while if they stick to q1; their utility is q1 + 1x1 + 2x2; where x1; x2 are
the old and new customersfractions that stick or buy q1; respectively. If these customers
coordinate on the Pareto optimal outcome, they will buy q2 even when all the other old
customers stick to q1 if:
p212  q + 2(1  2x2)  1   cu:24
We will consider the following two scenarios:
Scenario 4 (A4): q + 2   1   cu < 0. In this scenario and in equilibrium, old
customers do not buy the rivals product of quality q2 as they are better-o¤ by retaining the
dominant rms initial version.
Scenario 5 (A5): q + 2   1   cu > 0. In this case and in equilibrium, the rst
period customers are better o¤ by purchasing the rival rms new product.
If the quality improvement from the rivals new product is relatively small (A4), new
customers prefer the product of quality q2 if:
p222   p121  q   1;
and thus, the optimal rmsprices are: p222 = q   1; p121 = 0:
If old customers buy the rivals version (A5 holds), new customers prefer the new product
23We consider here that these customers were already induced to buy q1 in the previous period (see the
Appendix):
24See the Appendix for the price these customers are willing to pay to purchase the product of quality q1
if they coordinate to what all the other members of their class prefer.
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rather than the old if:
p222   p121  q + 1;
and the competitorsoptimal choices are: p222 = q + 1; p121 = 0; p212 = q + 2  
1   cu:
In the scenario that both competitorsR&D processes are successful, consider rst the
new customers. After they observe the competitorsprices, their utility if they all purchase
the dominant rms or the rivals q2 is q2+2+1x1 c p221; q2+2+1x01 c p222;
respectively, where x1; x
0
1 are the old customersfractions that belong to either of the rivals
network. If they all buy the dominant rms initial version, their utility is q1 + 2+
1(1   x1   x01)   c   p121: Thus, these customers will choose to purchase the dominant
rms superior product if:
q2 + 2 + 1x1   c  p221 
 maxfq2 + 2 + 1x01   c  p222; q1 + 2 + 1(1  x1   x
0
1)  c  p121g
Moving our attention to the old customers, their utility if they purchase q2 from either the
dominant or the rival rm is q2 +2x2 +1x1  cu  p211; q2 +2x02 +1x01  cu  p212;
respectively while if they stick to the initial version q1; their utility is q1+2(1 x2 x02) +
1(1   x1   x01): Thus, they will choose to buy the dominant rms product of quality q2
even if all the other old customers either stick to the initial version or buy the rivals new
version if:
q2 + 2x2   cu   p211  q2 + 1 + 2x02   cu   p212
and
q2 + 1 + 2x2   cu   p211  q1 + 1 + 2(1  x2   x02):
Note that when A4 holds and old customers coordinate on the Pareto optimum, their utility
if they purchase the rivals product of quality q2 is not an option for them as it is strictly
dominated by their alternative of sticking to q1. The dominant rms optimal choice is to
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stop selling the initial version to the new second period customers, the equilibrium prices
are p221 = 1; p222 = 0; p211 = q + 2   cu and all customers buy the dominant rms
superior product. When A5 holds, the whole market buys either the rivals or the dominant
rms new version and Bertrand competition drives all prices to zero.
The scenarios where the dominant rm is the only innovator as well as the case where no
rms R&D process is successful lead to the same market outcome as in the economy that
operates under mandatory compatibility.25
3.2.2 First and initial period (t = 1 and t = 0)
In the rst period (t = 1), the dominant rm decides the optimal price of his initial ver-
sion of quality q1 wishing to extract customersexpected total surplus and potential buyers
(1) make their purchasing decisions, depending on their expectations regarding the market
participantssecond period behaviour.
Moving to the initial period (t = 0), both competitors choose their investment levels
aiming to maximise their expected prots.26
The next proposition summarizes the market equilibrium outcome in an economy that
operates under a laissez faire Competition Law:27
Proposition 2 (a) For relatively less innovative future products (A4), the dominant rms
optimal choice is not to support compatibility. (b) For su¢ ciently innovative products (A5):
(1) both rms welcome compatibility for a relatively large initial market size (1), (2) if the
rst period market size is relatively small, the rival rejects to o¤er interoperability information
to the initial market leader.
Proof. See the Appendix.
25See the Appendix for the table containing the equilibrium second period prices under the di¤erent
scenarios.
26See the Appendix for the competitorsmaximization problems and their optimal investment choices as
functions of the rivals optimal choice.
27Note that the dominant rm would be indi¤erent between supporting and impeding compatibility if old
consumers coordinate to what all the other old consumers prefer.
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For less innovative products (A4), incompatibility prevails in the market as the dominant
rm prefers not to share his network with the smaller innovative rival. More precisely, for
relatively weak network e¤ects (A3) and unlike the rival, the dominant rm invests more
under incompatibility while for stronger network externalities (A2), the dominant rm would
have invested more if compatibility was compulsory.28 On the other hand, for su¢ ciently
innovative products relative to network externalities (A5), the dominant rm both welcomes
compatibility and invests more even if the rival is a direct future competitor. This happens as
the gains from sharing its network outweigh the potential costs: more precisely, by supporting
compatibility, the probability that he is the only inventor increases allowing him to enjoy a
larger second period expected prot exceeding the loss from a lower rst period prot. The
rival faces a trade-o¤: if she supports compatibility, the probability of being the sole second
period supplier decreases while it allows her to set a higher price to existing customers (1).
Thus, for a relatively large rst period market size, her optimal choice is to o¤er compatibility
to the market leader (b1). In a such a case, she also invests more than in a economy that
incompatibility is mandatory. When the number of old customers is smaller (b2), unlike the
dominant rm, the rival is better-o¤ by not supplying interoperability information to the
initial market leader.
4 Social Welfare Maximization
We consider the problem faced by a social planner who wishes to maximise the sum of
consumersand producerstotal discounted expected surplus. He has access to the rms
cost functions and can invest into the two research lines as well as choose his attitude towards
compatibility.29
If the planner supports compatibility, all customers are expected to buy the improved
version of quality q2 in the second period (A1), joining a network of maximum size. For
28See gures 2 and 3 in the Appendix.
29We call the initial line whose past R&D success produces q1 as Research line 1.
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less innovative products (A4) and unlike the case where innovations are relatively important
(A5), if compatibility is not supported, old customers only buy the Research line 1 new
version.
The next proposition summarizes the socially optimal investment and compatibility
choice and provides a comparison with the market equilibrium obtained in an economy
operating under mandatory compatibility or a laissez faire Competition Law:
Proposition 3 a) If A4 and A2 hold, the social planner decides to support compatibility.
Although the economy that operates under mandatory compatibility leads to overinvestment
while a laissez faire Competition Law may lead to underinvestment, the laissez faire Compe-
tition Law is socially preferable. b) If A4 and A3 hold, the planner may choose to support
compatibility. The market equilibrium outcome in a laissez faire economy leads to incompat-
ibility and is always socially preferable compared to the market equilibrium under mandatory
compatibility. c) If A5 holds, the planner is indi¤erent between supporting and impeding
compatibility.
Proof. See the Appendix
For less innovative products (A4), although a laissez faire economy leads to the dominant
rm rejecting compatibility, the magnitude of the potential ine¢ ciency is smaller compared
to the economy that operates under mandatory compatibility. In particular, when network
e¤ects are relatively weak (A3), a laissez faire Competition Law leads to more balanced
R&D incentives for both rivals and is certainly socially preferable compared to the economy
that mandates compatibility where the dominant rm underivensts and the rival overinvests
heavily.30 Similarly, when network externalities are relatively stronger (A2), a market where
interoperability is compulsory leads to overinvestment and a laissez faire Competition Law
is socially preferable although the rival is deterred to invest.31
30See gure 3 in the Appendix.
31See gure 2 in the Appendix.
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In conclusion, we could say that a Laissez faire Competition Law is socially preferable
compared to an economy that either mandates compatibility or imposes very strong Intel-
lectual Property Rights.
5 Conclusion
The rst contribution of this work is that we give an alternative explanation of why dominant
rms may welcome compatibility. More precisely, we show that sequential innovation and
su¢ ciently innovative products in an economy with durable, network goods allow the market
leader to voluntarily supply interoperability information even to direct future competitors. In
fact, when compatibility is present, the dominant rm invests more increasing his probability
of success as well as the probability that he is the only inventor in the market. On the
other hand, the rivals optimal choice depends on the market size: if the number of initial
customers is su¢ ciently large, she will also support compatibility while this is no longer true
for a smaller initial market size.
Our second contribution relates to the dominant rms R&D incentives as we show that
they are not curbed under incompatibility for less innovative products. In particular, we nd
a critical cuto¤ in network externalities below which the market leader invests more when
he refuses to support compatibility to his future potential rival.
Third, we hope to contribute in the discussion with respect to the social desirability of
a more interventionist Competition Law: we nd that when network e¤ects are weak, a
laissez faire Competition Law is socially preferable compared to an economy that operates
under mandatory compatibility as a laissez faire market either converges to compatibility
or when this doesnt occur, incompatibility is socially benecial. When network external-
ities are strong, unlike a laissez faire market, an economy that operates under mandatory
compatibility leads to overinvestment.
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We acknowledge limitations of this piece of research. First, current work considers the
interaction of di¤erent business models when the quality improvement is endogenous and
is not modelled as a parameter when network e¤ects and durability are present. Further
research could also analyze the competitorsR&D incentives and compatibility decisions in
the face of stochastic demand.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Second period prices when old customers coordinate to what
all the other old customers do
6.1.1 Compatibility
The cases where both or none of the competitors innovate yield the same equilibrium second
period prices as in the case that customers coordinate to the Pareto optimum.
Thus, lets think of the case that the rival is the only rm that innovates in the second
period. Old and new customers purchase the product of quality q2 if:
q2 +   cu   p212  q1 + 2x2;
or equivalently:
p212  q + 1 + 2(1  x2)  cu
and
q2 +   c  p222  q1 + 2 + 1x1   p121
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or
p222   p121  q + 1(1  x1)
are satised, respectively. From A1, old customers buy the new version and the equilibrium
second period prices are: p222 = q + 1; p212 = q +   cu; p121 = 0:
6.1.2 Incompatibility
We will show that the second period equilibrium prices are equal to the case of mandatory
compatibility.
If only the rival rm innovates, old customers buy the new product and do not stick to
q1 if:
q2 + 1 + 2x2   cu   p212  q1 + 2(1  x2)
or equivalently
p212  q + 1 + 2(2x2   1)  cu
while the new customers buy the product of quality q2 if:
q2 + 2 + 1 1   c  p222  q1 + 2 + 1(1   1)  p121
or equivalently if:
p222   p121  q + 1(2 1   1):
Thus, similarly to the case where compatibility is mandatory, the second period equilibrium
prices are p222 = q + 1; p212 = q +   cu; p121 = 0:
Note that if both rmsR&D processes are successful, we obtain the same second period
equilibrium prices as in the case compatibility is mandatory.
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6.2 Tables regarding the second period prices
The next table summarizes the di¤erent potential cases as well as the rivalsoptimal second
period prices charged to the new and the old customers under compatibility:
Prices to 2 Prices to 1
Both rms innovate p22i = 0; 8i = 1; 2 p21i = 0; 8i = 1; 2
Only the Dominant innovates p221 = q2 +   c p211 = q + 2   cu
Only the Rival innovates p222 = q + 1 p212 = q + 2   cu
Noone innovates p121 = q1 +   c already bought at t = 1
Under mandatory incompatibility, the following table summarizes all the potential second
period cases as well as the rivalsprices to the di¤erent customersclasses under A4 when
both rms invest into producing an improved version of quality q2:
Prices to 2 Prices to 1
Both rms innovate p221 = 1 p211 = q + 2   cu
Only the Dominant innovates p221 = q2 +   c p211 = q + 2   cu
Only the Rival innovates p222 = q   1 p212 = 0
Noone innovates p121 = q1 +   c already bought at t = 1
while under A5, the table becomes:
Prices to 2 Prices to 1
Both rms innovate p222 = 0; p221 = 0 p21i = 0; 8i = 1; 2
Only the Dominant innovates p221 = q2 +   c p211 = q + 2   cu
Only the Rival innovates p222 = q + 1 p212 = q + 2   1   cu
Noone innovates p121 = q1 +   c already bought at t = 1
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6.3 Calculating rms investment decisions as a function of the
rivals optimal choices
6.3.1 Mandatory compatibility
Given the market leaders price (p11), rst period customerstotal discounted expected utility
if they purchase the product q1 is:
q1 + 1   c+ s1(1  s2)(qe2 +   cu   pe211) +
+(1  s1)s2(qe2 +   cu   pe212) + s1s2(qe2 + a  cu) +
+(1  s1)(1  s2)(q1 + a)  p11;
where s1; s2 are the dominant rms and the rivals probabilities of successfully innovating,
respectively and the subsrcipt e denotes the expectation for the quality improvement and the
second period prices. Note that the market leader wishes to extract 1 customersexpected
total surplus by setting the highest price p11 that would induce them to buy q1 and thus, his
optimal rst period choice is:
p11 = q1 + 1   c+ s1(1  s2)(qe2 +   cu   pe211) + (1  s1)s2(qe2 +   cu   pe212) +
+s1s2(q
e
2 + a  cu) + (1  s1)(1  s2)(q1 + a): (1)
Moving back to the initial period (t = 0), the two rms simultaneously choose their invest-
ment levels. Thus, the smaller rms maximization problem is:
max
s20
8><>: s2(1  s

1)(2p222 + 1p212)  s22=2 if s2 > 0
0; otherwise
9>=>; : (2)
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The similar maximization problem for the dominant rm is:
max
s10
8>>>><>>>>:
1p11 + 1s1(1  s2)p211 + 2s1(1  s2)p221+
+2(1  s1)(1  s2)p121   s21=2; if s1 > 0
1p11 + 2(1  s2)p121; otherwise
;
9>>>>=>>>>; (3)
where p11 is given in (1) and s2 is the rivals optimal investment choice.
The rival and the dominant rms investment decisions as a function of the competitors
optimal choice are:
s2 = (1  s1)(qe + 212   1cu); (4)
s1 =  s2(2qe   12) + (qe   1cu); (5)
respectively.
6.3.2 Mandatory incompatibility
If A4 holds, the rivals optimization problem is:
max
s40
8><>: (1  s

3)s42p
e
222   s24=2; if s4 > 0
0; otherwise
9>=>; ; (6)
where s4 is her investment choice and s3 is the dominant rms optimal investment decision.
The similar maximization problem faced by the market leader is:
max
s30
8>>>><>>>>:
1p11 + 1s3(1  s4)pe211 + 2s3(1  s4)pe221+
+2(1  s3)(1  s4)pe121 + 2s3s41   s23=2; if s3 > 0
1p11 + 2(1  s4)pe121; otherwise
9>>>>=>>>>; (7)
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where the price p11 extracts the rst period customers expected surplus and is given by the
expression:
p11 = q1 + 1   c+ s3(1  s4)(qe2 +   cu   pe211) + s3s4(qe2 +   cu   pe211) + (8)
+(1  s3)(1  s4)(q1 + ) + (1  s3)s4(q1 + 1):
When old customers expect to purchase the product of quality q2 in the second period
independently of which rm innovates (A5 holds), the competitorsproblems become:
max
s40
s4(1  s3)(2pe222 + 1pe212)  s24=2; (6)
max
s30
1p11 + 1s3(1  s4)pe211 + 2s3(1  s

4)p
e
221 + (7)
+2(1  s3)(1  s4)pe121   s23=2;
for the rival and the dominant rm, respectively and the rst period price is:
p11 = q1 + 1   c+ s3(1  s4)(q1 + 1) + s3s4(qe2   cu) + (9)
+(1  s3)(1  s4)(q1 + ) + (1  s3)s4(q1 + 21):
Note that when both rmsR&D is successful, all customers are expected to buy the product
of quality qe2 from either of the incompatible competitors. Thus, they will be part of a network
of size x, with x being any non-negative number. Thus, in the rst period, the dominant
rm may risk losing these customers if he charges a price greater than p11 dened above.
6.4 Proof of Proposition 2
a) If A3 and A4 hold, the dominant rm always refuses to support compatibility. To see this,
let E(no compatibility)=f(s) and E(compatibility)=g(s) denote the dominant rms expected
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prot under incompatibility and compatibility, respectively, where f(0)>g(0).
We take the derivative of the two functions with respect to the dominant rms choice
(s): fs =  [s4(qe 12 1cu) (qe 1cu)] s while gs = [qe 1cu s22(qe 
1)] s; where s4; s2 are the rivals optimal choices under incompatibility and compatibility,
respectively (see gure 3).
The dominant rm is better-o¤ by not supporting compatibility when:
s22(q
e   1)  s4(qe   12   1cu) > 0; (*)
where the rivals choices lie on the lines:
s2 = (1  s)(qe + 212   1cu); and s4 = (1  s)2(qe   1):
Without loss of generality, we assume that the discount factor is large ( = 1): After
substituting s2 and s4 in * we get:
(1  s)(qe + 212 1cu)2(qe 1)  (1  s)2(qe 1)(qe 12 1cu) > 0
which always holds and thus fs > gs 8s:
After solving for s1; s

3; one gets:
s1 =
qe   1cu   (qe + 212   1cu)(2qe   21)
1  (qe + 212   1cu)(2qe   21)
and
s3 =
qe   1cu   (qe   12   1cu)(2qe   21)
1  (qe   12   1cu)(2qe   21)
and after substituting to the expressions for s2; s

4; we get:
s2 = [1 
qe   1cu   (qe + 212   1cu)(2qe   21)
1  (qe + 212   1cu)(2qe   21) ](q
e + 212   1cu)
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and
s4 = [1 
qe   1cu   (qe   12   1cu)(2qe   21)
1  (qe   12   1cu)(2qe   21) ]2(q
e   1):
Thus, * becomes after some algebraic manipulation:
(qe + 212   1cu)[1  (qe   12   1cu)2(qe   1)] >
(qe   12   1cu)[1  (qe + 212   1cu)2(qe   1)]
which simply veries that s3 > s

1:
Thus, the dominant rm impedes compatibility.
Note that if A4 and A2 hold, the rivals optimal choice is not to invest (s4 = 0) and
the dominant rm chooses not to support compatibility. Think for example the following
parameter values that satisfy A4 and A2: qe = 0:3;  = 1; 1 = 0:7; 2 = 0:3; cu = 0:1;
c = 0:2; q1 = 0:1; q2 = 0:4;  = 1: Direct comparison of the dominant rms values of
maximised expected prot show that he impedes compatibility.
b1) Think for the example the case where: qe = 0:9;  = 1; 1 = 0:8; 2 = 0:2; cu = 0:2;
c = 0:3; q1 = 0:1; q2 = 1;  = 1.
Direct comparison of the two rmsexpected prots lead to the conclusion that they
both support compatibility.
b2) Think of the parameter values: qe = 0:4;  = 1; 1 = 0:3; 2 = 0:7; cu = 0:2;
c = 0:3; q1 = 0:1; q2 = 0:5;  = 1.
Direct comparison of the rmsexpected prots yields that the dominant rm supports
compatibility while the rival rm rejects it.
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6.5 Proof of Proposition 3
Depending on whether the planner invests or not and whether he supports compatibility or
not, the social welfare function if A4 holds is:
max
;00
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
1(q1 + 1   c) + 1(+ 0   0)(qe2 +   cu)+
1(1  )(1  0)(q1 + ) + 2(+ 0   0)(qe2 +   c)+
+2(1  )(1  0)(q1 +   c)  2=2  02=2; ; 0 > 0 if he supports
compatibility,
1(q1 + 1   c) + 1(qe2 +   cu) + 10(1  )(q1 + 1)+
+1(1  )(1  0)(q1 + ) + 2(+ 0   0)(qe2 +   c)+
+2(1  )(1  0)(q1 +   c)  2=2  02=2; ; 0 > 0 if he
does not support compatibility,
1(q1 + 1   c+ q1 + ) + 2(q1 +   c);  = 0 = 0;
9>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>;
; (10)
where ; 
0
are the planners investment choices in Research lines 1 and 2, respectively.
a) If A4 and A2 hold, the social planner will make the two products in the second period
compatible if the maximum value of the social welfare function is higher compared to the
scenario he makes incompatible products. If max SWcom; maxSWincom are the highest values
in the social welfare if he supports compatibility or not, it is immediate to see that in the
latter case, he only invests in improving the dominant rms product.
The planner supports compatibility when:
maxSWcom > maxSWincom
or equivalently when the expression:
1(+ 
0   0   00)(qe2 +   cu) + 1[(1  )(1  
0
)  (1  00)(q1 + )] +
2(+ 
0   0   00)(qe2 +   c) + 2[(1  )(1  
0
)  (1  00)(q1 +   c)]
29
is positive, where ; 
0
are his optimal investment choices when he chooses compatibility
and 
00
is his optimal investment if he chooses to have incompatible products satisfying the
equations:
 =  0(qe   1cu) + (qe   1cu);

0
=  (qe   1cu) + (qe   1cu);

00
= (qe   1cu):
Note that  = 
0
= 
+1
; where  = (qe   1cu); 0 <  < 1 :
Thus, we need to show that:
1f( 2
+ 1
  
2
(+ 1)2
  )(qe2 +   cu) + [(1 

+ 1
)2   (1  )](q1 + )]g+
2f( 2
+ 1
  
2
(+ 1)2
 )(qe2+ c)+[(1 

+ 1
)2 (1 )](q1+ c)g 2 
2
(+ 1)2
+2 > 0
or equivalently:
1
1  2   
(+ 1)2
(qe   cu) + 21  
2   
(+ 1)2
qe + 2   2
2
(+ 1)2
> 0:
For parameter values satisfying A1, A2, A4, the above expression takes a positive sign. Think
for example the parameter values satisfying A1, A2 and A4 ( = 1; 1 = 0:7; qe = 0:3;
cu = 0:01). Direct calculation leads to the conclusion that the above expression is positive
and thus the planner chooses compatibility.
b) If A4 and A3 hold, the social planner decides to support compatibility if:
maxSWcom > maxSWincom
or equivalently the expression:
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1(+ 
0   0   00)(qe2 +   cu) + 1[(1  )(1  
0
)  (1  00)(1  000)](q1 + ) 
 1000(1  00)(q1 + 1) + 2(+ 0   0   00   000 + 00000)(qe2 +   c) +
+2[(1  )(1  0)  (1  00)(1  000)](q1 +   c)  2=2  02=2  002=2  0002=2
takes a positive sign. It is straightforward to see that for parameter values satisfying A4
and A3 (for example, take qe = 0:4; 1 = 0:7;  = 0:5;  = 1; c = 0:4; cu = 0:3; q1 = 0:1),
the planner supports compatibility as the social welfare function is maximised.
6.6 Figures regarding the competitorsand the planners optimal
investment decisions
The next gures summarize the market equilibrium outcome under a laissez faire Competi-
tion Law and under mandatory compatibility as well the social optimum level of investment:
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Figure 2: A4 and A2
Figure 3: A4 and A3
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